I. INTRODUCTION
The interstate recognition of relationships has posed numerous foundational questions for time immemorial. For example, both in United States and transnational practice, the portability of marriage and other interpersonal relationships, as well as the portability of these relationships' terminations through devices like divorce, has raised fundamental questions about the nature of 'family' and how this concept gets translated across jurisdictional borders. Indeed, over the years, officially monogamous European nations have had to decide the extent to which they will recognize the polygamous marriages of persons emigrating from places like North Africa or South Asia. And, in the United States, one of the more vexing issues in family law-and still unresolved after the recent Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Windsor 1 and Hollingsworth v. Perry 2 -has been whether an officially heterosexual U.S. state should (or must) recognize a same-sex marriage or civil union entered into within the boundaries of another U.S. state. Whether European or American, inter-jurisdictional relationship-recognition has posed deep and important questions as to the comparability and compatibility of different jurisdictions' family law practices.
This essay seeks to explore and complicate the contemporary U.S. interstate same-sex relationship-recognition debate, but from an untraditional perspective-one which might be labeled not only untraditional, but also 'queer.' As with all explorations, and especially queer ones, this essay's destination is far from certain and not necessarily a conclusive one. That being said, one primary goal of this essay is to urge a reconsideration of the relevance of popular notions of equality to the interstate relationship-recognition debate in the United States. Indeed, as this essay will suggest, to the extent that equality intends to treat identical things identically, 3 it is not a value that is easily applicable to the radical plurality of American family law-a plurality that complicates even the translation of any state's 'marriage' as 'marriage' outside of that state. Quite simply, then, this essay seeks to explore what interstate relation-ship-recognition might look like if the inter-jurisdictional equation looked less like 'marriage = marriage' and more like 'marriage ≠ marriage. ' A great deal of (liberal) academic writing and political and legal work on interstate same-sex relationship-recognition has attempted to use the idea of equality to argue for the universal recognition of a legally-conducted same-sex marriage, regardless of whether or not a 'receiving state' conducts same-sex marriages itself. For example, under this view, equality dictates that Missouri recognize the same-sex marriage of a couple who marries in the bordering state of Iowa, a state that conducts same-sex marriages, regardless of Missouri's extant legal prohibition on conducting same-sex marriages in Missouri itself. As this 'marriage equality' thinking often tautologically goes, 'marriage is marriage' and, hence, a same-sex marriage conducted in one jurisdiction should be recognized equally as a marriage in all other jurisdictions. 4 This essay, however, aims to queerly complicate this easy conclusion concerning 'migrating same-sex unions'
5 by querying whether all states' marriages are, in fact, the same institution-even putting aside the question of differences between states on same-sex marriage specifically. Moreover, in problematizing the view that all U.S. states are essentially trying to do the same thing via the marriages these states 4. See, e.g., Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 544 (W.D. Ky. 2014 ) (holding that "Kentucky's denial of recognition for valid same-sex marriages violates the United States Constitution's guarantee of equal protection under the law"); Respect for Marriage Act, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/laws-and-legislation/federal-legislation/respect-for-marriageact (last updated Mar. 24, 2014) (noting how " [p] rior to a June 2013 ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) singled out lawfully married same-sex couples for unequal treatment under federal law. This law discriminated in two important ways . . . [including] allow [ing] states to refuse to recognize valid civil marriages of same-sex couples [entered into in other states]"); Steve Sanders, A New Front for Marriage Equality: Recognizing Same-Sex Marriages from Other States, AM. CONST. SOC'Y BLOG (July 31, 2013) , http://www.acslaw.org/ acsblog/a-new-front-for-marriage-equality-recognizing-same-sex-marriages-from-other-states (noting how a federal judge in Ohio very recently characterized "an amendment to [ PROBS. 153, 156 n.10 (2008) , for a discussion of the term 'migrating' to explain the numerous kinds of traveling relationships in which I am interested here. Like Cossman, I am interested in "the full range of traveling marriages and civil unions, that is, marriages and unions that are entered into in one jurisdiction, and for a variety of reasons, then travel to another jurisdiction where some legal recognition [by the state] is sought." Id.
individually conduct, this essay also aims to problematize any simplistic grafting of equality onto the contemporary interstate relationship-recognition debate concerning same-sex relationships specifically.
Any suggestion that even an opposite-sex marriage cannot easily be translated as 'marriage' outside of this marriage's home state will be a difficult one for many readers of this essay to digest. Indeed, as Part II of this essay's brief summarization of both historical and contemporary U.S. approaches to the interstate recognition of formal interpersonal relationships (as well as their official terminations) suggests, any highly pluralistic approach to U.S. family law has tended to pose uncomfortable and distressing possibilities for many U.S. judges, lawyers, and legal academics alike.
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As a result of this American discomfort with pluralism, another lens on interstate relationship-recognition is needed (at least for this essay's purposes). Part III of this essay, then, builds upon the author's background as a comparativist, using experience from the United Kingdom ("U.K.") and the dilemmas it has faced about whether to recognize overseas divorces, to demonstrate how one influential legal context has viewed the highlighting of inter-jurisdictional family law pluralism to be not only plausible but also desirable.
Part IV returns the focus back to the contemporary United States, exploring what the implications of adopting a U.K.-like, pluralismembracing approach might be for the contemporary interstate relationship-recognition debate in the United States. Indeed, as this concluding Part's pluralism-oriented discussion of different U.S. states' marriage definitions will suggest, if one does not shy away from how 'marriage' is legislatively defined differently in different U.S. states, one finds that 'marriage' is never simply-or equal to-'marriage' anywhere in the United States. As a result, it is far from clear that sameness-oriented equality plays necessary, relevant, or desirable roles-at least in the ways it is often claimed to play such roles-in the contemporary U.S. interstate relationship-recognition debate.
Ultimately, this essay's queer explorations will lead to an uncomfortable possibility-for liberals and conservatives alike-namely that same-sex marriages and civil unions (or domestic partnerships) cannot simplistically be inter-jurisdictionally translated in the United States as 'marriage' always, but neither can opposite-sex 'marriage' itself. Indeed, insisting on the identity, or equality, of marriage from U.S. state to U.S. Milliron, No. 310710, 2013 WL 5663227 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2013 . In this case, decided by a State of Michigan appellate court, the court refused to recognize that the plaintiff had standing as a 'parent' vis-à-vis the child custody issue because "to recognize plaintiff's same-sex union as a marriage under the equitable parent doctrine would directly violate the [Michigan] constitutional provision that, 'the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.'" Id. at *3 (emphasis in original). While the court in Stankevich did not decide whether a Michigan trial court had the power to then, seems to be the stuff of history books. At the very least, it is not a phenomenon that many contemporary U.S. legal actors seem to be comfortable with.
Pluralism between the states with respect to the definition and understanding of 'family' and 'relationships' did not simply disappear in the late-twentieth century United States, however. At the very least, the idea and possibility of legal pluralism maintained its potency, as recent legal developments certainly confirm. In this respect, the creation of same-sex marriage, civil unions, domestic partnerships, and other formal relationships in some states-but not others-has highlighted the fact that interstate disagreement about relationship and family norms has persisted even with the pan-U.S. facilitation of divorce and interracial marriage.
The robustly pluralistic bent of U.S. family law is also evident in a surviving section of the U.S. federal government's 1996 Defense of Marriage Act, 15 concerning interstate recognition of marriage. In this section, Congress-ostensibly acting on its powers to define the reach of the U.S. Constitution's 'full faith and credit' provisions 16 -explicitly (1942 confirmed states' powers to refuse recognition to same-sex marriages entered into outside of their borders. The federal affirmation of such a state power to refuse inter-jurisdictional recognition of same-sex marriages both countervailed, and also aligned with, historical practice concerning interstate recognition of marriages. The general practice of U.S. states has been to recognize marriages entered into in any other U.S. state as long as local laws and rules in that other state, the 'place of celebration,' were complied with. 17 Yet there has always been a 'public policy' exception to this general 'place of celebration' recognition rule, even if the reach of that exception has varied in the minds of states and scholars.
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While family law pluralism has thus persisted at many levels and in many different ways in the United States, the recent judicial, political, and scholarly discussion of interstate recognition of same-sex relationships has largely revolved around trying to minimize or ignore this pluralism. In these discussions, one might say that the focus has been on 'the United States,' rather than 'the United States.' Moreover, in these discussions, the question presumed and presented-whether by supporters or opponents of the interstate recognition of same-sex relationships-is one concerning whether a generic 'marriage' entered into in one U.S. jurisdiction should be recognized as a generic 'marriage' in another U.S. jurisdiction (whether for purposes of marriage itself or post-marriage/divorce).
19 Indeed, the 'marriage'-register of this discusConstitution's delegation to Congress to determine the reach and scope of Article IV, Section 1, but then declared that Congress would not compel any state to extend 'full faith and credit' to any other state's same-sex marriage, thereby essentially giving no effect to Article IV, Section 1 with respect to same-sex marriages. The specific text of the relevant section of DOMA is as follows: No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship. Defense of Marriage Act § 2.
17. This 'place of celebration' rule is embodied in the Restatement (Second) sion is mostly inescapable, even for some of the most interesting interventions into this discussion. 20 As a result, migrating 'civil unions' or 'domestic partnerships' get inter-jurisdictionally translated as 'marriages' in this conflicts debate 21 -and, just as oddly, 'Massachusetts marriages' get equated with 'Mississippi marriages'-without evident inter-jurisdictional conflicts about the nature of formal relationships sparking any critical discussion about whether these kinds of 'marriage' translations are correct. This is not to say that these kinds of translations are necessarily implausible or undesirable, but it is to say that more critical attentionand respect-could be paid to actual legal categories and nomenclatures rather than assuming that every legal system, whether domestic or foreign, operates in the same way, and for the same purposes, with the same notions of family and marriage. 22 In other words, more respect for family law pluralism could be realized. The next Part of this essay turns to an example of a jurisdictional context that has felt the need to highlight pluralism in family law practices, rather than to bury it. The sovereign U.S. states offer up a particular kind of family law pluralism. While this family law pluralism is evident, it is arguably the case that European states have existed in a context of relatively more heightened sovereignty and consciousness of family law pluralism. 23 At the very least, the softening touch of English lingual homogeneity-and the accompanying 'luxury' of translating 'marriage' as 'marriage' interjurisdictionally-often does not exist when interstate relationship-recognition is done in Europe. Because of Europe's especially deep acquaintance with family law pluralism, this Part engages in a European case study-in particular, one from the United Kingdom-as a helpful exemplar of how one could surface some of the family law plurality which is present but nonetheless suppressed in the U.S. interstate relationshiprecognition debate.
The United Kingdom was perhaps the European country historically most implicated in colonial enterprises around the globe. As a result of these colonial enterprises, the United Kingdom has faced a steady stream of legal questions concerning the marital status of people who have migrated from its former colonies and, despite this migration, have still chosen to conduct some of their family law matters in their countries of origin. Such a situation is on full display in the well-known U.K. case of Chaudhary v. Chaudhary. 24 Chaudhary is a relatively old case, dating from 1985, and also one whose day-to-day relevance has been overtaken in many ways by more-recent statutory law.
25 Nonethe- In this complicated case concerning the inter-jurisdictional recognition of (post-)marriage, the main question presented was whether a talaq effectuated in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir (also known as Azad Kashmir) by a U.K.-residing husband served-in the eyes of the United Kingdom-to terminate the marriage of this husband with his wife (who was also from Azad Kashmir but who had recently arrived in the United Kingdom). This is the essential question that both the U.K. trial court and the Court of Appeal had to decide. 26 Both of these courts' opinions are relied on here in the course of explicating the complicated facts of this case. After this explication, this Part concludes with an analysis of how the Court of Appeal's resolution of this case engages in an interjurisdictional pluralism-promoting approach to family status-an approach that many U.S. legal actors would find distinctly troubling.
The husband whose actions were in question in Cohabitation lasted less than two weeks, however, and Bibi Saira Chaudhary returned to Pakistan with three of her children.
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Shortly thereafter, Mr. Chaudhary sought out and received a talaq from Bibi Saira Chaudhary at a London mosque.
39 As the trial court described this legal event, "[Mr. Chaudhary] went to the mosque . . . and pronounced an oral talaq three times in Urdu before two witnesses. . . . As the wife was in Pakistan it was decided that in addition a talaknama or written document should be made out and a copy sent to her." 40 While Mr. Chaudhary claimed that this talaknama was sent to Bibi Saira Chaudhary in Azad Kashmir, there is some question as to whether she actually received it. 41 In any event, it appears that ultimately she did learn of Mr. Chaudhary's pronouncement of talaq and, as a result, decided to return to the United Kingdom in July 1977. 42 31. See id. at 24. 32. According to the trial court, "on 18 August 1969 the husband went through a second ceremony of marriage with Hamida in a Muslim court in Beirut. He gave as the reason for this second ceremony that the certificate of marriage from there would be acceptable world wide." Id. While not the focus of this litigation, in this second ceremony in Beirut, again we see people's concern with the portability of their relationships and also a concern that 'marriage' in a secular proceeding creates, at least in some instances, less of an internationally-recognized status than does a religious proceeding.
33 48. This terminology is used to describe the kind of talaq 'divorce' that Mr. Chaudhary pronounced (twice) in the set of events described in this Part. There are other kinds of talaq procedures recognized by the many schools of thought that give shape to the classical Islamic tradition. These other kinds of talaq are as effective as the kind that Mr. Chaudhary utilized (i.e. three pronouncements in one sitting) but are generally viewed with more religious favor and sanction, seeing that they give the marital couple more opportunity for reconciliation.
49. Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act, 1971, c. 53, § 2(a)-(b) (U.K.) (emphasis added). A secondary question was also presented in this litigation in the event that the 1971 Act could recognize a bare talaq as a divorce, namely whether the United Kingdom could still refuse recognition to this kind of talaq on grounds of public policy. Chaudhary, Fam. at 34. According to the trial court, public policy was a residual common law consideration in interjurisdictional relationship-recognition cases in the United Kingdom, and was also specifically legislated by the 1971 Act at Section 8(2) as a principle that could be used to limit the United Kingdom's recognition of some kinds of 'divorces' otherwise cognizable under the 1971 Act. Lord Justice Oliver concurred with the legal result reached by Cumming-Bruce and also had the following to say about a 'bare talaqcum-divorce' and why such divorce is actually not divorce, at least for the purposes of the United Kingdom:
The essentials of the bare talaq are, as I understand it, merely the private recital of a verbal formula in front of witnesses who may or may not have been specially assembled by the husband for the purpose and whose only qualification is that, presumably, they can see and hear. It may be, as it was in this case, pronounced in the temple. Finally, Judge Balcombe also wrote to concur that, in his precedent-informed view, not all overseas divorces should count as divorces in the United Kingdom: Read together, one can characterize the Court of Appeal panel members' opinions in Chaudhary as willing to translate the Islamic legal practice of talaq as 'divorce,' but unwilling to translate a talaq/divorce performed in Azad Kashmir into a divorce enforceable in the United Kingdom. In other words, after reading these opinions, one is left with the distinct feeling that 'divorce' is very much not a generic practice across the world. In the United Kingdom, at least, 'divorce' connotes a non-unilateral practice conducted with the knowledge and oversight (however limited) of another party external to the marriage. For the Court of Appeal, however, an Azad Kashmir 'divorce' is not like a United Kingdom 'divorce'-and, in fact, is perhaps more akin to a private testamentary will.
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The relevant law in the United Kingdom has changed since the 1985 decision in Chaudhary.
58 However, the attention that the Court of Appeal gave to Mr. Chaudhary's practices (or lack thereof) in pursuing 55 his (second) talaq provides an intriguing exemplar of how and why a given jurisdiction might deploy pluralism-embracing analyses of other jurisdictions' family law practices. The next Part turns to how the kind of pluralism-oriented analysis deployed in Chaudhary could play out in the contemporary U.S. debate over interstate recognition of same-sex relationships. In this debate, the assumption amongst many is that a generic 'marriage' is the register most appropriate to any interstate same-sex relationship-recognition analysis, as well as that 'equality' is necessarily deeply imbricated in this ongoing social and legal debate.
IV. MARRIAGE ≠ MARRIAGE
The Chaudhary case is not only a testament to the possibility that legal statuses may not easily translate across jurisdictional bordersbeing 'divorced' in one place may not mean being 'divorced' in another place-but, relatedly, that fairly fundamental legal categorizations may not translate so easily either. With respect to this latter observation, one particularly intriguing aspect of the set of opinions issued in Chaudhary is Lord Justice Oliver's observation that Mr. Chaudhary's actions in Azad Kashmir were perhaps more akin to will-making than divorcingor, read at another level, more involving an act pertaining to property law rather than family law.
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Taking inspiration from Chaudhary's pluralism-embracing approach to interstate relationship-recognition, this concluding Part explores how the particulars of U.S. states' legislative definitions of 'marriage' make it difficult to translate 'marriage' as 'marriage' across jurisdictional lines-whether that 'marriage' is same-sex or oppositesex. As in Chaudhary, the different ways states fundamentally categorize relationship status-as belonging to family law or another legal domain altogether-contribute to this interstate translation conundrum.
To help get an initial grasp on the plurality of U.S. states' marital practices, this Part first takes a brief and non-comprehensive 'road-trip' across different U.S. states and these states' different definitions of marriage. This Part then concludes with a discussion of how a deeper focus on various states' (post-)marriage definitions and practices can problematize the 'marriage equality' analysis that many academics, activists, and legal actors are demanding with respect to the interstate recognition of same-sex relationships.
A. Marriage Road-Tripping U.S. states not only define marriage differently, but do so in a num-59. See supra text accompanying note 55. Beyond differences in the particular method by which U.S. states define marriage, states' substantive definitions also vary wildly. For example, an Alabama statute declares that " [m] arriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man and a woman. . . . Marriage is a sacred covenant, solemnized between a man and a woman . . . which is recognized by the state as a civil contract."
61 While Michigan's definition of marriage echoes Alabama's emphasis on the uniqueness of marriage-with Michigan defining marriage as a "unique relationship between a man and a woman" 62 -Michigan seemingly has less faith that the language of contract comports with that uniqueness. Thus, in the same statutory provision that mentions the uniqueness of opposite-sex marital relations, Michigan refers to same-sex marriages-which it refuses to recognize-as relationships merely "contracted between individuals of the same sex."
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Traversing the country to Arizona, one finds Alabama-like 'covenant marriage,' but not in Arizona's basic definition of marriage. Indeed, no Arizona statute directly defines 'marriage simpliciter'-rather than defining marriage, the emphasis is on who may not marry. 64 However, a specific Arizona statute does allow people to enter into a special kind of marriage-known as a 'covenant marriage'-going on to declare that this type of marriage "is a covenant between a man and a woman who agree to live together as husband and wife for as long as they both live." A. Marriage between parents and children, including grandparents and grandchildren of every degree, between brothers and sisters of the one-half as well as the whole blood, and between uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews and between first cousins, is prohibited and void. B. Notwithstanding subsection A, first cousins may marry if both are sixty-five years of age or older or if one or both first cousins are under sixty-five years of age, upon approval of any superior court judge in the state if proof has been presented to the judge that one of the cousins is unable to reproduce. C. Marriage between persons of the same sex is void and prohibited. 65. Id. § 25-901(B)(1) (2013). Traveling even farther west, to California, one finds marriage defined differently still. Until the recent set of events opening up marriage in California to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples, California defined marriage as "a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman"-the restriction on the gender of marital partners has now been removed but the rest of the definition remains.
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In this definition, there is little trace of the religiosity accompanying both Alabama's and Arizona's covenant-oriented marital definitions, yet, simultaneously, there is overlap with Alabama's and Michigan's 'relational' language. Like California, Idaho too has declared marriage to be a "personal relation arising out of a civil contract" (and has restricted the contracting parties to "a man and a woman").
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All the way back on the east coast, Connecticut contributes a noteworthy definition of marriage to the national landscape. Connecticut defines marriage without explicitly referencing the marital parties' genders but also suggests a fusion of these parties-rather than their dyadic relationship-when it defines marriage as "the legal union of two persons."
68 Interestingly, Georgia echoes Connecticut's 'union language' but re-genders such a union; according to the Georgia constitution, " [t] his state shall recognize as marriage only the union of man and woman." 69 Florida's definition of marriage also invokes the language of "union" while, like Georgia, also gendering such a union. In this respect, a Florida statute declares: "For purposes of interpreting any state statute or rule, the term 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife." 70 Louisiana's definition of marriage is very similar to this Florida definition.
71
To conclude this brief road-trip of U.S. states' different marital definitions, Kentucky's definition of marriage is one of the more unique and intriguing ones. This definition confirms the civil status of Kentucky marriages, yet also the union of one man and one woman that sits at their core:
As used and recognized in the law of the Commonwealth, "marriage" refers only to the civil status, condition, or relation of one (1) man 66. CAL. FAM. CODE § 300(a) (West 2013) . This definition of marriage was determined to be unconstitutional by In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008) . In that case, the California Supreme Court determined "that the language of section 300 limiting the designation of marriage to a union 'between a man and a woman' is unconstitutional and must be stricken from the statute, and that the remaining statutory language must be understood as making the designation of marriage available both to opposite-sex and same-sex couples. 74 Such scholarship and activism has worked to (1) argue for same-sex marriage in various U.S. states as the self-evident outcome of a constitutional equality analysis, and also worked to (2) limit the options of whichever uncooperative, outlier states remain by requiring them to recognize same-sex marriages entered into in other U.S. states-again using arguments pertaining to a certain idea of equality. 75 2012) . Abrams' piece is dedicated to exploring the multiple federal and state doctrines and tests that have developed over time to determine whether a particular marriage, or divorce, is a 'real' marriage or, instead, an attempt to defraud either one of the marital partners or the state. As Abrams notes, both proponents and opponents of 'marriage equality' problematically "assume that 'marriage,' even as its meaning has shifted over time, has a stable meaning today." Id. at 63.
74. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. same-sex marriage rights across the United States the desired eventual outcome. This concluding section problematizes this liberal 'marriage equality' strategy, focusing on its interstate dimensions. Previous work of this author has demonstrated dangers and shortcomings in any marriage equality analysis as applied within a particular jurisdiction. 76 Here, however, the focus is on problematizing the ways in which scholars and activists want 'marriage equality' to work between and across (state) jurisdictions. As is evident from the following discussion-and also liberal scholars' and activists' extant legal strategies-the intra and interstate dimensions of marriage equality cannot be neatly separated from each other. That being said, each of the three problematizations of marriage equality sketched out here will have an explicit interstate relationship-recognition analysis attached to it.
The first problematization stems from questions about how much interstate 'marriage' recognition the idea of equality can accomplish, especially in light of this essay's observations about the intense plurality of family law in the United States. For example, returning to the example of Kentucky, it is likely the case that eliminating the requirement in Kentucky's statutory marriage definition that marital parties be oppositesex would result in the conducting of same-sex marriages in Kentucky. Yet, it is not clear that that marriage would actually open up marriage for Kentuckian same-sex marital partners outside of Kentucky. Indeed, drilling down into what marriage actually means or implies in Kentucky, it may be that a 'Kentucky marriage'-whether same-sex or oppositesex-is best understood as a 'civil union.' 77 In other words, the interstate translation of this 'Kentucky marriage' using sameness-oriented equality as a translation filter might result in a 'civil union'-not a 'martechnical tools in the service of a conservative politics of the traditional family. Both sides wear their recognition or nonrecognition politics on their sleeves, notwithstanding the attempt to dress them up in more technical clothes." Id.
Hillel Levin's work provides an important exception to the kind of scholarship that Cossman describes. He strongly supports same-sex marriage rights in the United States but is simultaneously hesitant about using conflicts analysis or anti-DOMA strategies to pursue these rights. See Hillel Y. Levin, Conflicts and the Shifting Landscape Around Same-Sex Relationships, 93, 94 (2010) . Levin is particularly worried about using a conflicts analysis to achieve same-sex marriage rights because same-sex marriage advocates, like him, "have argued that this is a matter internal to the states. Thus, to turn around and use conflicts as a wedge to achieve recognition in other states would be disingenuous. . . . We have used conflicts as a shield; to now use it as a sword would be a mistake." Id. at 102. 76. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Redding, Dignity, Legal Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 791 (2010) .
77. See supra text accompanying note 72. riage'-in a state like Illinois. 78 Section 60 of the recently enacted Illinois civil union statute reads as follows: "A marriage between persons of the same sex, a civil union, or a substantially similar legal relationship other than common law marriage, legally entered into in another jurisdiction, shall be recognized in Illinois as a civil union." 79 As a result, the use of equality arguments in this kind of interstate context might have no marital consequences.
The second problematization is not one of no marital consequences, but undesired marital consequences. These undesired consequences can be of at least two sorts: 'not enough marriage' and 'too much marriage.' With respect to 'not enough marriage' and, for example, imagining that same-sex marriage becomes available in Idaho, 80 it is worth remembering that Idaho's definition of marriage characterizes marriage as a "personal relation arising out of a civil contract."
81 As a result of this definition, a couple married in Idaho may find another state-using an equality lens-merely recognizing their marriage as a dyadic contract with few or none of the benefits that marriage supposedly brings via its recognition by the state and other third parties. 'Even worse,' that state may consider the Idaho marriage as creating simply a friend-like relationship with few legal implications attaching to that kind of inter-personal relation.
82 With respect to 'too much' interstate recognition, here the states that define marriage as involving some sort of covenant create the conundrum. For example, partners marrying in a state like Alabama-which describes marriage as being, at least in part, "a sacred covenant, solemnized between a man and a woman" 83 -and then moving to a state like Arizona-i.e., a state not only possessing an undefined 'marriage simpliciter' but also a specifically legislated 'covenant marriage'-may find that equality gives them a kind of marriage in Arizona that neither Alabama partner would have previously contemplated or desired. Arizona's special covenant marriage, for example, puts limits on no-fault divorce. 84 The third problematization of the use of equality in the interstate 78. Illinois civil unions are available for both same-sex and opposite-sex couples. See Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/10 (2014 relationship-recognition domain relates to how the value of equality is being misused by many in the 'marriage equality' movement more generally. As this author has argued elsewhere, the marriage equality movement has too often sought equality without asking important questions about whether equality comports with other important progressive values. 85 The impulse has seemed to be 'sameness first, questions later.' With the interstate relationship-recognition debate, it appears that equality is again being used to advocate sameness, if also to imagine it out of evident difference. Indeed, it is quite questionable whether Connecticut's 'fusion marriage' 86 is really the same thing as Idaho's 'civil-relational marriage' 87 or, more generally, whether any two U.S. states actually have mutually intelligible 'marriage.'
To be sure, U.S. states do recognize each other's marriages, but not for reasons of equality precisely-a reality that marriage equality advocates' work often occludes. Indeed, more so than equality, it appears that a very strong U.S. desire to encourage marriage-qua-marriage-a desire matched in its strength by the strength of the United Kingdom's desire to discourage talaq/divorce-is what drives interstate recognition of marriage in the United States. In line with this larger cultural impulse, mainstream gay and lesbian advocates have also largely decided to valorize marriage-for all people everywhere-using arguments pertaining to family stability, the welfare of children, 88 and other traditional values and priorities. This essay has suggested how this valorization of marriage-now using a simplistic version of equality-gets repeated, however oddly, in the interstate domain.
In response to this use of an antiseptic equality in order to valorize marriage, this essay has suggested, however, an important and overlooked question, 'What marriage?' And in elaborating this questionresponse, this essay has explored the ramifications of a difference-oriented, pluralism-embracing lens on the contemporary interstate samesex relationship-recognition debate. While this pluralism lens might 85. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Redding, Querying Edith Windsor, Querying Equality, 59 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 9, 9 (2013 [and] the impact of non-recognition on the couple's children," going on to later lament how a "Georgia appellate court . . . ruled . . . that a woman was not 'married' to her civil union partner for purposes of measuring her compliance with an order specifying that visitation with her children would not be allowed when she was cohabitating with an adult to whom she was not legally married. The court's ruling relied in part on the fact that a civil union, under Vermont law, is not a 'civil marriage.'" Grossman, supra note 14, at 436, 485.
